Abstract. We consider an environment in which agents face various choice sets, assembled from a finite universe of objects, and choose a single object each time a choice set is presented to them. Models for probabilistic discrete choice give, for each choice set, a discrete probability distribution over that choice set. We use methods of Bayesian model comparison to measure the empirical plausibility of various axioms of probabilistic discrete choice. Our testing ground is a model with very little structure -a priori, there are no restrictions on choice distributions across choice sets. We reanalyze several existing data sets, including ones obtained using experimental designs intended to elicit intransitive revealed preferences. We find empirical evidence in favour of random utility, the hypothesis that all choice probabilities are governed by a random utility function over the universe of objects. We also find evidence against the multiplicative inequality of Sattath and Tversky (1976) . Since the multiplicative inequality is a necessary condition for independent random utility, a refinement of random utility stipulating that the utilities of objects are mutually independent, this constitutes evidence against independent random utility.
Introduction
We consider an environment where agents face various choice sets A, all subsets of the same finite master set T = {x 1 , . . . , x n } of objects. Agents choose a single object from a choice set A each time it is presented to them.
Standard models for stochastic discrete choice specify choice probabilities P A (x), for all x ∈ A ⊆ T . We assume that these choice probabilities describe the choice behaviour of a single agent. This assumption holds for the data we analyse here; alternatively, we could interpret choice probabilities as describing the choice behaviour of agents randomly drawn from some population. We also assume that choices are statistically independent across presentations of choice sets.
A random choice structure (T, P ) is the complete specification of the P A (x). As such, a random choice structure with no restrictions on probabilities is non-parametric; the finite number of unknown probabilities is a consequence of the finite nature of choice sets, not the arbitrary imposition of a finite parametric family of distributions.
With flexibility comes the danger of over-fitting and poor out-of-sample predictive performance. Prior information can impose discipline, and it comes in many forms, including probabilistic choice axioms imposing constraints on probabilities across choice sets. Various axioms have been suggested in the literature. See below for some examples and McCausland and Marley (2013) for further discussion, including graphical illustrations of the relationships among them.
The purpose of this paper is to propose, implement and demonstrate a testing ground for probabilistic choice axioms in an abstract choice setting. It involves applying methods of Bayesian model comparison to measure the plausibility of axioms in the light of discrete choice data. These include compound axioms, obtained as the union or intersection of other axioms. We investigate several particular axioms, but emphasize that our approach can be used to evaluate others, including those yet to be proposed.
1.1. Some axioms from the literature. Some axioms pertain only to binary choice probabilities. Due to the importance of these probabilities, we adopt a standard notational convention: for all distinct x, y ∈ T , we write p(x, y) for P {x,y} (x). The random choice structure (T, P ) satisfies TI: the triangle inequality if and only if for all distinct x, y, and z, p(x, y) + p(y, z) + p(z, Other axioms constrain choice probabilities on differently sized choice sets. We say that (T, P ) satisfies Reg: regularity if and only if for all A, B ⊆ T and for all x ∈ A,
MI: the multiplicative inequality if and only if for all A, B ⊆ T and all x ∈ A ∩ B,
For MI, see Sattath and Tversky (1976) , Colonius (1983) and Suck (2002) . For the remaining conditions, see Luce and Suppes (1965) . MI should not be confused with the multiplication condition in Luce and Suppes (1965) , which is a different axiom, involving only binary choice probabilities. McCausland and Marley (2013) survey in more detail the literature on theorems about these axioms, and graphically illustrate some of the relationships among them.
We will need some more notation to define a final condition. For all non-empty A, we define R(A) as the set of rankings on A; a ranking distribution on A is a pair (A, Π) such that Π is a probability mass function on R(A). For any ranking distribution (T, Π), we define (T, P Π ) as the random choice structure such that for all non-empty A ⊆ T , and all x ∈ A,
where for every nonempty A ⊆ T and every rank order ∈ R(T ), h (A) is the highest -ranked object in A. Our final condition is this: a random choice structure (T, P ) satisfies the random ranking hypothesis, denoted RR, if there is a ranking distribution (T, Π) such that P = P Π . While this definition is not framed in terms of choice probabilities, there are necessary and sufficient conditions that are. Fiorini (2004) gives these conditions are as follows: for all non-empty A ⊆ T and all x ∈ A,
(1)
Block and Marschak (1960) and Luce and Suppes (1965, Theorem 49) show that the random ranking hypothesis is equivalent to what is often known as "random utility". Random utility models are those in which agents select from each choice set as if they drew, independently and from the same continuous distribution, a random utility function over the master set and then went on to choose the utility maximizing element from that set. The assumption that utilities have a continuous distribution implies that the probability that any two utilities are equal is zero. If the definition is only asserted for the binary choice probabilities, then the model is called a binary random utility model. If the utilities u x , x ∈ T , are mutually independent, then we say the model is an independent random utility model. When the master set has no more than five elements, TI is necessary and sufficient for binary random utility. See Dridi (1980) for a proof, Koppen (1995) and the literature cited there for additional necessary conditions when the master set has more than five elements. Sattath and Tversky (1976) show that MI is necessary for an independent random utility model.
There is a relatively long history in Economics, Psychology and Marketing, of theory and application of probabilistic discrete choice models. Most of these models are random utility models. Widely used random utility models include the (multinomial) logit, (multinomial) probit, McFadden's (1977) Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) model, the class of mixed (multinomial) logit models and Tversky's (1972) Elimination By Aspects (EBA) model.
Logit models are independent random utility models by construction. Probit models are random utility models, also by construction, but not necessarily independent random utility models. The class of GEV models explicitly includes logit, nested logit, paired combinatorial logit and generalized nested logit models. McFadden (1977) shows that a representation of choice probabilities characterizing GEV is equivalent to a random utility model where the vector of utilities has a generalized extreme value distribution. Dagsvik (1994) shows that the GEV class is dense in the set of random utility models. The class of mixed logit models explicitly includes latent class logit models. McFadden and Train (2000) show a limiting equivalence of the set of mixed multinomial logit models and the set of random utility models. See Train (2009) for more on these models.
The EBA model is not explicitly constructed as a random utility model, but Tversky (1972, Theorem 7) shows that it is indeed one. Sattath and Tversky (1976) show that EBA models satisfy MI, which we have seen is a necessary condition for independent random utility; however, Tversky (1972) gives an example of an EBA model that is not an independent random utility model.
In Economics and marketing, probabilistic discrete choice models are almost exclusively random utility ones. In Psychology, random utility models, including the models of Luce and Thurstone and EBA, are commonly used. See summaries in Luce and Suppes (1965) , Luce (1977) , Luce (1994) and Marley's (1992a Marley's ( , 1992b Marley's ( , 2002 editorial introductions to special journal issues. Models that are not necessarily random utility models include some dynamic stochastic choice models. These are summarized in Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Mellers (2006) and Busemeyer and Rieskamp (2013 • priors on choice probabilities, conjugacy, statistical (in)dependence across choice sets.
• binary and multiple choice • previous evidence for and against W, M and S stochastic transitivity • previous evidence for and against regularity, random utility, independent random utility]
1.3. Prior distributions for random choice structures. Bayesian analysis involves the choice of a prior distribution. McCausland and Marley (2013) propose a class of prior distribution on the space of random choice structures, indexed by two parameters, α and λ. The α parameter governs how consistent an agent is likely to be in repeated choices from the same choice set; for low values of α, a random choice structure drawn from the prior is likely to feature choice probabilities P A (x) close to zero and one; for high values of α, they are likely all to be close to 1/|A|. The λ parameter governs the degree of dependence of choice probabilities across choice sets. For λ = 0, the vectors (P A (x)) x∈A are mutually independent, A ⊆ T ; thus learning P A (·) gives no information about P B (·). For λ = 1, the random choice structure satisfies the random ranking hypothesis with probability one. While we do not know the joint density over the space of random choice structures in closed form, we do know the marginal distributions. They are
where Di(·) denotes the Dirichlet distribution -see Forbes, Evans, Hastings, and Peacock (2011).
1.4. Outline. Section 2 describes a model for discrete stochastic choice, consisting of a hierarchical prior distribution for a random choice structure (T, P ). The highest level of the hierarchy gives a prior distribution for the hyper-parameters α and λ of the class of priors in McCausland and Marley (2013) . Section 4 describes posterior simulation methods. It does not help us that the marginal prior distribution of each P A (·) is Dirichlet, the conjugate distribution for the likelihood function for independent categorical data. Our decision to allow prior dependence across choice sets means that our joint prior distribution over all choice probabilities is not conjugate for the entire likelihood function. For this reason, we resort to Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation methods to simulate from the posterior distribution and compute posterior moments and quantiles of interest.
Section 5 reports results from the analysis of data from previous experiments. Section 6 concludes.
An Unrestricted Model for Discrete Stochastic Choice
A random choice structure (T, P ) gives a family of distributions for discrete stochastic choice. Here we complete the model by specifying a hierarchical prior distribution for the random choice structure (T, P ). We will call this the unrestricted model and denote it M 0 . We will also consider various restricted models, obtained by imposing different choice axioms.
The prior specifies the joint distribution of two hyper-parameters δ andδ, a vector γ of latent variables and the random choice structure (T, P ). At the upper level of the hierarchy are two hyper-parameters, δ andδ, a priori independent with distributions
The two parameters α and λ in McCausland and Marley (2013) are given as the following transformations of δ andδ:
We use δ andδ only for computational convenience; in the implied joint prior distribution of α and λ, α and λ are independent, with
The next level of the hierarchy gives the conditional distribution of latent variables given hyper-parameters, a distribution described in McCausland and Marley (2013) . Given hyper-parameters, the latent variables are conditionally independent. For each ranking ∈ R(T ), there is a latent variable γ( ) with conditional distribution
For each choice set A and each ranking ∈ R(A), there is a latent variableγ A ( ) with conditional distribution
The lowest level of the hierarchy gives choice probabilities as deterministic functions of the latent variables:
We denote by γ the vector of all weights γ( ) andγ A ( ). We use the same prior distribution for all participants in all experiments, and do posterior inference for each participant separately. Alternatively, one could extend the hierarchical prior to induce dependence of random choice structures across participants -the resulting joint analysis would "borrow strength" across individuals -but we do not pursue this here.
Thus, we do not need to introduce notation to distinguish participants in the experiment. For the remainder of the section, we assume we are discussing the choices of a single participant.
For every A ⊆ T and x ∈ A, we observe N A (x), the number of times the participant chooses object x when presented with choice set A. For all A ⊆ T , let N A be the vector (N A (x)) x∈A of all choice counts associated with A. Let N be the vector of all choice counts, (N A (x)) A⊆T,x∈A . In some cases, there will be a choice set B that the participant never sees. In such a case, the vector N B (·) will be zero. Note, however, that since the P A (·), A ⊆ T , are statistically dependent across choice sets, the posterior distribution of P B (·) will not be the same as its prior distribution.
Since we assume choice events to be independent across choice sets, the log likelihood function can be written as
It will be helpful to decompose the log likelihood by choice set. Accordingly, we write
where
Bayes Factors
We evaluate the plausibility of an axiom in the light of observed data by reporting a simulation consistent approximation of the Bayes factor in favour of a restricted model M r , in which the axiom holds, against the unrestricted model M 0 . By Bayes' rule, we can express this Bayes factor as
where Λ is the event that the axiom holds for (T, P ).
The left hand side gives the Bayes factor as it is usually defined, in terms of a ratio of marginal likelihoods. The right hand side is a ratio of the posterior to the prior probability of the axiom holding in the unrestricted model. A high posterior probability is a measure of how consistent the data are with the axiom; a low prior probability is a measure of how small or parsimonious the model becomes when the axiom is imposed. In McCausland and Marley (2013), we pointed out that the numerator probability cannot exceed one, which implies that the reciprocal of an axiom's prior probability gives an upper bound on the Bayes factor in favour of the restricted model in which the axiom holds, no matter how much data is collected for a single decision maker.
We will approximate the numerical and denominator probabilities using prior and posterior simulation, respectively, and compute variances of the simulation errors.
Prior and Posterior Simulation
Most techniques of Bayesian empirical analysis involve computing moments and quantiles of prior or posterior distributions of unknown quantities. Prime examples include point and interval estimation, model comparison, prior and posterior predictive analysis, and out-of-sample prediction. See Berger (1985) , Bernardo and Smith (1994) and Geweke (2005) .
Closed form evaluation of many prior and most posterior moments and quantiles is intractable, so practitioners usually resort to Monte Carlo simulation methods. First, they draw a sample from the appropriate target distribution; then they approximate moments and quantiles of the target by their sample counterparts. Independence Monte Carlo, based on an iid sample, is usually practical when the target is the prior distribution and infeasible when it is the posterior.
We compute prior moments using independence Monte Carlo. We draw a random sample (δ (j) ,δ (j) , γ (j) ), j = 1, . . . , J, from the prior distribution by direct simulation from the gamma distributions in (2), (3) and (4). We use routines from the GNU Scientific Library to draw gamma random variables.
We report prior probabilities of various axioms in the unrestricted model. Denoting by Λ the event that an axiom holds, Pr[Λ|M 0 ] is the axiom's prior probability. Since prior draws are independent and identically distributed, the fraction of draws in which the axiom holds, denotedPr[Λ|M 0 ], is simulation consistent for Pr[Λ|M 0 ], and the numerical standard error σ nse is σ nse = Pr
To determine whether an axiom holds for a given draw γ (j) ,
we use the robust methods described in McCausland and Marley (2013) , to guard against classification errors due to machine rounding error. In cases where independence Monte Carlo is impractical, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods may be useful. Here, the sample is the realization of an ergodic Markov chain whose unique invariant distribution is designed to be the target distribution. Laws of large numbers and central limit theorems for ergodic Markov chains are available to describe and measure simulation error. For texts introducing MCMC, see Gilks, Richardson, and Spiegelhalter (1996) and Robert and Casella (2010) . For details on basic Markov chain asymptotic theory, see Meyn and Tweedie (1993) .
We now describe an ergodic Markov chain whose invariant distribution is the posterior distribution for the unrestricted model, the conditional distribution of hyper-parameters δ,δ and γ given data N . As in many chains used for posterior simulation, the random transition from the current state of the chain to the next consists of a sequence of several Metropolis-Hastings transitions, each updating some of the unknown quantities of the model in such a way as to preserve the posterior distribution. When we say that a stochastic transition preserves a distribution we mean that the distribution is an invariant distribution of the transition. See Chib and Greenberg (1995) for a tutorial on the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
A single transition of the chain consists of a sequence of three Metropolis-Hastings updates, described in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. Once we have a posterior sample γ (j) , j = 1, . . . , J, we can obtain a posterior sample P (j) , j = 1, . . . , J, using (5), draw by draw.
A Metropolis-Hastings update for δ and γ( ),
∈ R(T ). The first update is a Metropolis-Hastings transition replacing current values δ and γ( ), ∈ R(T ), with random new values δ and γ ( ), ∈ R(T ). It preserves the conditional distribution of δ and γ( ), ∈ R(T ), givenδ, other latent variables, and data N .
(1) Draw β ∼ Be(πa, (1 − π)a) and ∼ Ga((1 − π)a, b), with β and mutually independent and independent of the history of the chain, and form the candidate value δ * = βδ + . Since β and are only devices used to obtain δ * , they are discarded. The random transition from δ to δ * is an example of a Beta-Gamma transition, and it preserves the conditional distribution of δ given a and b -see Appendix A.
Here, π ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed parameter governing the degree of dependence between δ and δ * . (2) For all ∈ R(T ), (a) if δ * > δ, draw the proposal γ * ( ) from the following conditional distribution of γ * ( ) given γ( ), δ and δ * :
(b) if δ * ≤ δ, draw γ * ( ) from the following conditional distribution:
(3) Jointly accept the proposal consisting of δ * and γ * ( ), ∈ R(T ), with probability min
Accepting the proposal means setting new values equal to proposals; here, setting δ = δ * and γ ( ) = γ * ( ), ∈ R. Rejecting means setting new values equal to old values; here, setting δ = δ and γ ( ) = γ( ), ∈ R.
Appendix A shows that the update described here is a true Metropolis-Hastings update of the conditional distribution of δ and γ( ), ∈ R, given data, other parameters and other latent variables.
4.2.
A Metropolis-Hastings update forδ andγ A ( ), A ⊆ T , ∈ R(A). The second update does something very similar for the hyper-parameterδ and theγ A ( ), A ⊆ T and ∈ R(A).
(1) Draw β ∼ Be(πã, (1 − π)ã) and ∼ Ga((1 − π)ã,b), independently, and form
Appendix A shows that this update is a true Metropolis-Hastings update of the conditional distribution ofδ andγ A ( ), A ⊆ T and ∈ R, given data, other parameters and other latent variables.
4.3.
A Metropolis-Hastings update forγ A .
(1) For all A ⊆ T and ∈ R(A),
This a sequence of direct Metropolis updates, each updating the conditional distribution of one of theγ * A ( ) given everything else. These updates do not change the state of the chain by much. Furthermore, they are redundant in the sense that the variables being updated are also updated in the second Metropolis-Hastings update. However, they are cheap because only parts of the likelihood need to be reevaluated. 4.4. Numerical standard errors. In Section 5, we report several MCMC sample means that are simulation consistent for their population counterparts. We compute numerical standard errors using the mcmc() function of the R package CODA, documented in Plummer, Best, Cowles, and Vines (2006) . This function uses a time-series method based on an estimate of the spectral density of an MCMC chain at frequency zero.
Results
Here we report artificial data simulations testing the correctness of our posterior simulation methods, and do posterior analysis for data from an experiment reported in Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober (2011).
Getting it right.
Here we perform a simulation designed solely to test the correctness of our posterior simulation methods. This is a purely pre-data exercise, involving artificial data and not observed data. The tests described here are similar to those described in Geweke (2004) . We draw a sample from the joint distribution of hyper-parameters, latent variables and data, for an artificial choice experiment where the master set has n = 3 elements and all subsets of size two and three are presented exactly once. We complete the specification of the prior by choosing values a = 10,ã = 10 and b = 0.1, and complete the specification of the proposal distribution by choosing the value π = 0.5.
The first draw of the sample is a direct draw from the joint distribution of δ,δ, γ and N , obtained by first drawing hyper-parameters δ andδ from their prior distribution, then the latent variable vector γ from its conditional distribution given δ andδ, and then data from their (categorical) conditional distribution given γ. Subsequent draws are the output of a Markov chain whose invariant distribution is the joint distribution of δ,δ, γ and N . A single transition of the chain consists of four Metropolis-Hastings updates. Three are the very same updates used to update the posterior distribution. The fourth is a direct draw of N from its conditional distribution given hyper-parameters and latent variables.
If the Markov chain has the correct invariant distribution and if data simulation and posterior simulation are implemented correctly, then a realization of the chain must be a sample of draws from the correct joint distribution, although the draws will not be independent. This is a very strong condition that leads to multiple tests of program correctness.
We test 18 hypotheses implied by program correctness. We know that the marginal distributions of δ andδ are the same as their prior distributions, both Ga(10, 0.1). For all draws of δ andδ in the sample, we compute the value of indicator functions on the intervals [0, q], for values q equal to quantiles of the Ga(10, 0.1) distribution for probabilities p = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.8, 0.9. We then compare the sample means of these indicator functions with their supposed population counterparts, which are the probabilities 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.8, 0.9 themselves. Table 1 shows the results. Column p gives the nine probabilities. Column q gives the corresponding quantiles of the Ga(10, 0.1) distribution. Columnp, δ gives the sample mean of the indicator for hyper-parameter δ and the fourth column gives the numerical standard error forp. Columnp,δ gives the sample mean of the indicator for hyper-parameterδ and the sixth column gives the numerical standard error forp Table 1 . Sample probabilities for "Getting it right" computations 5.2. Posterior analysis. In Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober's (2011) experiment, each of 18 undergraduates participated in three different scenarios, denoted here and in that paper by "Cash I", "Cash II" and "Noncash". In each scenario, the master set contains n = 5 objects, and the objects are lotteries in which a prize is won with a certain probability. In "Cash I", the probabilities of winning replicate those from a similar experiment by Tversky (1969) . Prizes are monetary values, adjusted to approximately replicate the purchasing power of the original prizes in Tversky (1969) . In "Cash II", prizes are also monetary. Probabilities and prizes are chosen so that the expected monetary values of the five lotteries were identical. In "Noncash", the prizes were non-monetary. In each scenario, all 18 participants were presented all ten doubleton subsets of the master set twenty times.
We complete the specification of the prior by choosing values a = 0.95,ã = 0.05 and b = 0.5, and complete the specification of the proposal distribution by choosing the value π = 0.5. We use independence Monte Carlo to generate a prior sample of size J = 50000. For each participant, we use the MCMC chain described in Section 4 to generate a posterior sample of size J = 50000. Table 2 shows posterior means and standard deviations of α and λ, for the 18 participants and scenario 'Cash I'. The numerical standard error for the means is indicated and in all cases it is less than a tenth of the posterior standard deviation. The final line in the table indicates the prior means and standard deviations for comparison. Table 3 shows posterior probabilities of the three versions of stochastic transitivity, for the 18 participants and scenario 'Cash I'. It also indicates the Bayes factor in favour of each axiom, against the unrestricted model. The numerical standard error for the posterior axiom probabilities is also given. While the posterior probability of WST was very close to one for many subjects, the Bayes factor in favour of WST is only slightly higher than one, due to the high prior probability of WST. Only for participant 4 is there fairly strong evidence against WST. There is little evidence for or against MST, except for participants 4, 16, and 17, for whom there is evidence against. The prior probability of SST is much lower than that of MST, but most of the posterior probabilities fall by a larger factor. For many participants, the evidence against SST is very strong. Table 2 . Prior and posterior mean, standard deviation and numerical standard error of α and λ for the Cash I scenario Table 4 shows posterior probabilities and Bayes factors for TI, Reg and RR, with numerical standard errors indicated. Like WST, TI and Reg have quite high prior probability, so the Bayes factors in their favour are subject to quite severe upper bounds. Only for subject 16 is there much evidence against TI and Reg, and this evidence is not very strong. RR has very low prior probability, but the posterior probabilities are relatively high. There is some evidence in favour of RR for most subjects, but it is not strong. Collectively, though, the evidence for RR is considerable, and there is no subject for which there is strong evidence against. Only for participant 16 is the Bayes factor lower than one; despite a low Bayes factor for TI, a necessary condition for RR, the Bayes factor for RR is not far from one. Clearly, the conditional posterior probability of RR given TI is considerably higher than the conditional prior probability of RR given TI.
We do not tabulate results for the multiplicative inequality, but the results were striking. The prior probability of the axiom is 0.0058 with numerical standard error 3.2 × 10 −4 . For most participants, not a single posterior draw of a random choice structure satisfied the axiom. For participants 4, 6, 9, 13 and 17, a single posterior draw, out of 5 × 10 4 , satisfied the axiom. Table 4 . Posterior probabilities, numerical standard errors and Bayes factors for TI, Reg and RR for the Cash I scenario chain with this transition density is known as the Beta-Gamma autoregressive process. Importantly, Lewis, McKenzie, and Hugus (1986) show that it is time reversible, which implies that (6) f Ga (α|a)q 1 (α * |α, a, π) = f Ga (α * |a)q 1 (α|α * , a, π).
We will never need to evaluate q 1 (·, ·) but we will need to invoke the time reversibility condition (6) to demonstrate the correctness of our Metropolis-Hastings updates. We now derive the transition density q 2 (y * |y, x, x * ) for a conditional transformation from y to y * given x and x * , where x > 0 and x * > 0, x = x * , are parameters. The transformation is defined as follows. If x * > x, then y * = y + , where and (y, x, x * ) are independent and ∼ Ga(x * − x). If x * < x, then y * = βy, where β ∼ Be(x * , x − x * ).
The conditional density associated with the conditional transition from y to y * given x and x * is q 2 (y * |y, x, x * ) = f Ga (y * − y|x * − x) x * > x, 1 y f Be y * y |x * , x − x * x > x * , where f Ga denotes the standard Gamma density, f Ga (y|x) = y x−1 Γ(x) , x > 0, y > 0, and f Be denotes the Beta density, f Be (y|x 1 , x 2 ) = Γ(x 1 + x 2 ) Γ(x 1 )Γ(x 2 ) y x 1 −1 (1 − y) x 2 −1 , x 1 , x 2 > 0, y ∈ (0, 1).
We now show an important result:
(7) f Ga (y|x)q(y * |y, x, x * ) = f Ga (y * |x * )q(y|y * , x * , x).
Proof: Write out the left hand side of (7) as f Ga (y|x)q(y * |y, x, x * )
where u(·) is the Heaviside, or unit step function, equal to one for non-negative arguments and zero for negative arguments. The last line has the symmetry property that replacing (x, y) by (x * , y * ) gives the same expression. The left hand side must have the same property, which is the desired result.
A.2. Hastings ratios. Writing out the full Hastings ratio for the first Metropolis-Hastings update gives
· q 1 (α|α * ) ∈R(T ) q 2 (γ( )|γ * ( ), α * /n!, α/n!) q 1 (α * |α) ∈R(T ) q 2 (γ * ( )|γ( ), α/n!, α * /n!)
, where γ * is understood to mean the vector γ of all weights, with the γ( ) weights replaced by γ * ( ), ∈ R. Using equation (6) and repeated applications of equation (7), the Hastings ratio reduces to
Therefore the first Metropolis-Hastings update is a true Metropolis-Hastings update preserving the conditional distribution of δ and γ( ), ∈ R(T ), givenδ, other latent variables, and data N . The analogous demonstration for the second Metropolis-Hastings update is very similar and we omit it.
